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I.   INTRODUCTION
This Article builds upon the issues aired during a panel discus-
sion at the Fifth Annual Conference for Florida Mediators and Arbi-
trators, an event that marked the tenth anniversary of the Florida
Dispute Resolution Center (DRC). In effect, the Conference marked
the end of a decade of the ADR revolution in Florida. Court-ordered
mediation was established and mandated for many state cases be-
ginning with the enactment in 1987 of chapter 44, Florida Statutes
(“Mediation Alternatives to Judicial Action”),1 although this resulted
from substantial ADR efforts during the 1970s and early 1980s that
laid the groundwork for ADR’s arrival as official state policy. Since
ADR became official state policy, mediation has become part of the
legal landscape in Florida, but issues continue to rage concerning the
proper scope and process of mediation. The panel discussion, entitled
“Evaluative v. Facilitative Mediation: Current Ethical and Policy
Considerations,” reflects a debate conducted nationally as well as in
                                                                                                                   
* Fonvielle & Hinkle Professor of Litigation, Florida State University College of Law.
B.A., University of Minnesota, 1977; J.D., Yale Law School, 1981. Special thanks to James
Alfini, E. Donald Elliot, Ann McGinley, Robert Moberly, Sharon Press, Mark Seidenfeld,
and Jean Sternlight for ideas and assistance. Thanks also to the Florida Dispute Resolu-
tion Center staff as well as the Fifth Annual DRC Conference panelists and participants,
and to Dean Donald Weidner and the Florida State University College of Law for contin-
ued support, which included research leave time during which this Article was finalized.
1. See Act effective Jan. 1, 1988, ch. 87-173, 1987 Fla. Laws 1202 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of FLA. STAT. ch. 44 (1995 & Supp. 1996)).
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Florida.2 Expanding upon my comments in the panel discussion,3 I
defend the evaluative aspects of mediation and question the notion
that “good” mediation must fit the facilitative model.4 Primarily,
however, I am not advocating evaluative mediation but rather en-
dorsing flexible mediation that permits judicious use of evaluative
techniques. Conceptual oversimplification occurs when the debate is
cast in the wooden form of evaluation versus facilitation. Not only is
this framing unwise and misleading, but it also may lead to govern-
ment-sponsored unfairness when the mediation enterprise takes
place under the auspices of court-compelled mediation.
In discussing the merits of evaluative and facilitative approaches,
scholars and participants have tended to overlook or understate the
importance of distinguishing between purely private mediation and
the semi-public mediation that occurs in states such as Florida that
have mandated mediation as part of the government’s official dis-
pute resolution process.5 When this system prevails, it is of no real
moment that the mediators are not state judicial employees. They
nonetheless are an integral part of the state’s dispute resolution ap-
paratus. In this environment, the state errs when it mandates an ex-
cessively formal version of the facilitative model, one that in some
cases may institutionalize unfairness. Instead, Florida law and pol-
icy should celebrate a more eclectic model of good mediation and, in
appropriate cases, provide a meaningful possibility of reviewing me-
diated outcomes for fairness.
                                                                                                                   
2. See Robert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical for Mediators to Evalu-
ate or Advise?, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997) (noting growth of mediator ethical
costs and emerging questions).
3. See James J. Alfini, Moderator, Evaluative Versus Facilitative Mediation: A Dis-
cussion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 919, 922, 927-28, 932, 934-35 (1997) [hereinafter Panel
Discussion].
4. See James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of
“Good Mediation”?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 47-50, 73-74 (1991) (noting that many or
even the bulk of mediation professionals define proper or “good” mediation as employing
exclusively facilitative approaches that preside over party-generated resolutions and sug-
gest areas for party exploration, but refrain from providing legal judgments or rendering
evaluation of the matter or any party positions).
5. A recent exception, published just after the panel discussion, is Jacqueline M.
Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q.
47, 62-75 (1996), which focuses on the degree to which mediation differs according to
whether it occurs solely through the parties’ efforts or is required as part of the court-
related dispute resolution process. Although Professor Nolan-Haley does not emphasize
the facilitative-evaluative debate, it is apparent that she concludes that a court-affiliated
mediator should, on occasion, take affirmative steps to prevent the mediation from be-
coming an arena of injustice, even when the parties appear to have made a “voluntary”
agreement. Although this proactive mediator should ordinarily avoid direct evaluation if
possible, Professor Nolan-Haley’s concern for unrepresented parties and for mediation
outcomes that, at least largely, parallel likely adjudication outcomes implicitly suggests a
role for judicious use of evaluative techniques by mediators in appropriate cases. See id. at
88-100.
1997]                         MEDIATOR’S ROLE 951
II.   THE FALSE PREMISE OF THE FACILITATIVE-EVALUATIVE
DICHOTOMY
A.   The Unnecessary Either/Or Perspective on ADR
Although the panel discussion provided a most interesting ex-
change of views, it proceeded on the basis of what I hope some day
will be universally recognized as a false dichotomy.6 In particular,
the fallacious framework for our discussion has been the notion that
mediation is, or must be, either “facilitative” (designed to allow par-
ties to work out a consensual resolution of their disputes) or “evalua-
tive” (designed to provide a neutral viewer’s assessment of the rela-
tive merits of the issues in order to move the parties to a resolution).7
In my view, notwithstanding respected views to the contrary,8 this
                                                                                                                   
6. The formal title of the panel discussion—“Evaluative v. Facilitative Mediation: A
Discussion”—suggests that the two modes of mediation are polar opposites with no com-
mon overlap. See Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 1.
7. The facilitative-evaluative dichotomy has been widely accepted, at least for pur-
poses of framing discussion, by many ADR commentators. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH
BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT
THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 11-12 (1994) (describing the mediation
movement as being at a “crossroads” where it must choose between a “problem-solving”
method of mediation, which makes use of evaluative techniques as a spur to settlement,
and a “transformative approach,” generally described as more facilitative in tone with an
eye toward “fostering empowerment” of the parties); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding
Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV.
NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7, 10-16 (1996) (reviewing variants of evaluative and facilitative ap-
proaches to mediation); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-
Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 340-42 (1996) (noting a variation in mediation and other
ADR methods according to whether the device provides a primarily adjudicatory (evalua-
tive) or settlement-brokering (facilitative in combination with evaluative) role); Leonard
L. Riskin, Two Concepts of Mediation in the FHA’s Farmer-Lender Mediation Program, 45
ADMIN. L. REV. 21, 24-30 (1993) (noting the presence of a primarily evaluative and a pri-
marily facilitative approach in mediations conducted under the auspices of the federal
farm lending program); Craig A. McEwen, Pursuing Problem-Solving or Predictive Settle-
ment, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 77, 78-84 (1991) (describing varieties of evaluative and facili-
tative approaches); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture:
A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or “The Law of ADR”, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 1-4, 18-20
(1991) (perceiving a tension between a facilitative, party-centered view of mediation and
systemic goals of case resolution consistent with legal norms); Susan S. Silbey & Sally E.
Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 7, 19-20 (1986) (describing evalua-
tive and facilitative techniques employed by mediators).
Although some degree of polarity can be a useful analytic device or means of organizing
discussion, labels of this type inevitably tend to organize thought as well, sometimes con-
stricting it and leading analysis astray.
8. Professors Robert A. Baruch Bush and Lela Love, for example, are two prominent
and respected commentators who can at least be interpreted as arguing that facilitative
mediation is the one true way and that any infusion of evaluative techniques essentially
corrupts mediation and alchemizes it into something else and something less. For exam-
ple, Professor Bush has argued that mediation be defined in a more or less singular fash-
ion and, implicitly, that his version of the facilitative approach—transformation and
empowerment of the parties—should be the standard:
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notion is simply wrong.9 Good mediators should be both facilitative
and evaluative in varying degrees. In addition, the view that media-
tors act as either facilitators or evaluators represents a triumph of
excessively formalist thinking at a time when effective dispute reso-
lution law and policy require a functional approach.
To some extent, I am setting up a straw entity in order to attack it
in furtherance of my thesis. As the panel discussion at the DRC Con-
ference unfolded, it became quite clear that panelists themselves had
subtle and nuanced views on the topic. Those panelists previously
identified with the facilitative perspective would not absolutely pre-
clude mediators taking actions that would in all likelihood lead to
making assessments of the disputants’ positions10 and behavior.
                                                                                                                   
[F]or every mediator to choose for himself what conception to adopt—which
may be close to the present situation—does not seem a good idea at all. The
result would be that different mediators would handle similar dilemmas in en-
tirely different fashion. Not only would this be unfair to individuals, it would
be damaging to the reputation of mediation as a whole. The lack of uniformity
and common standards would undermine confidence in and respect for media-
tion.
Robert A. Baruch Bush, Ethical Dilemmas in Mediation 20 (1989) [hereinafter Bush, Ethi-
cal Dilemmas] (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also BUSH & FOLGER,
supra note 7, at 7-8; Robert A. Baruch Bush, The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice: A
Study of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Implications (Nat. Inst. Disp. Resol. monograph
1992) (presenting revised and updated version of 1989 paper).
Professor Love makes a similar case for the benefits of facilitation and the need to de-
fine mediation as an essentially facilitative enterprise in her contribution to this Sympo-
sium. See Lela Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 937, 946 (1997) (“A Uniform Understanding of Mediation Is Critical to the
Development of the Field.”).
For reasons set forth below, I disagree that such singular uniformity is required or de-
sirable.
9. Most polar models are wrong if taken too rigidly. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Lon
Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and
Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273, 1274-76 (1995) (arguing persua-
sively that litigation generally serves both dispute resolution and policy-setting functions
and that adjudication cannot be exclusively or even primarily defined by either model).
Dichotomous models are useful heuristic devices for aiding understanding, particularly
for framing issues and enabling discussion to proceed within a realm of common terminol-
ogy and understanding. For example, even though I criticize the “evaluative-facilitative”
model as inaccurate, this Symposium demonstrates the model’s utility for framing and
fomenting vigorous discussion. When another participant speaks of facilitative techniques,
I have a basic understanding of what they mean. When I talk of evaluative approaches,
they know basically what I mean. However, even good heuristic models work mischief
when they are used not only to illustrate, but also to limit debate or thought or to create
bright line criteria for identifying mediation practice as good or bad, legitimate or illegiti-
mate, or pure or vulgarized.
10. See Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 934 (comments of Professor Lela Love)
(noting that when confronted with a party’s desire to enter into an agreement barred by
applicable law, mediators can raise “concerns about the legality of the agreement and ad-
vise them to get legal counsel”); id. at 922 (comments of Professor Cheryl McDonald) (re-
jecting the mediator’s authority to state an opinion about a judge’s decisionmaking repu-
tation in landlord-tenant matters because “there are a lot more ways and more neutral
ways in which both parties could be alerted to the possibility that judges, being human
beings, might have particular biases that might have an impact on their case and that’s
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However, partisans of evaluation were willing to impose some limits
on the evaluative mediator to prevent mediation from becoming
early neutral evaluation or, worse yet from the perspective of a facili-
tative mediator, arbitration or coerced settlement engineered by a
nonjudicial officer.11 As applied to the hypothetical problems ad-
dressed by the panel, it seemed clear that neither ironclad facilita-
tion nor inflexible evaluation enjoyed universal support.
In view of the panelists’ tacit appreciation of these issues, the
prominence of the facilitative-evaluative dichotomy suprises me.
How can the battle lines be so strictly drawn when so many of the
leading experts in the field seem not to subscribe to the premise of a
vast gulf between types of mediation? To some extent, classifications
and polarities serve as heuristic devices useful in illuminating a
subject and organizing discussion and debate. Nevertheless, organ-
izational labels and constructs tend to frame thought as well as dis-
cussion and can lead to narrowed and polarized analysis. When an
organizational dichotomy or nomenclature moves from being an
analytic device to becoming a yardstick for measuring and policing
mediators, the unnecessary dichotomization of mediation styles be-
comes something more than incorrect. An excessively compartmen-
talized and polarized view of mediation establishes a system that
may make mediation both less effective in resolving cases and more
                                                                                                                   
something they should both be thinking about”); id. at 928 (comments of Professor
McDonald) (noting that to educate parties and attempt to correct misimpressions, a me-
diator “might point them towards the library” but should not offer his or her own assess-
ment); id. at 923 (comments of Professor Robert Moberly) (noting that Florida Rule for
Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators 10.090(d) “doesn’t prohibit all opinions, but it
does prohibit [a mediator’s announced opinion] as to how the judge in that particular case
will rule”); id. (comments of Professor Moberly) (suggesting a distinction between permit-
ted and prohibited types of evaluation and urging “great caution in utilizing this sort of
opinion and evaluation”); id. at 925 (comments of Professor Moberly) (observing that the
mediator is allowed “to provide information . . . . [although] [t]he line between information
and advice may not always be so clear”); id. at 929 (comments of Professor Moberly) (“The
Florida Rules don’t prohibit all or even most evaluations. They only prohibit those specifi-
cally mentioned, or those that relate impartiality or self-determination. The Rules specifi-
cally allow mediators to point out possible outcomes of the case.”); id. at 924 (comments of
Javier Perez-Abreu) (accepting the premise that mediators are permitted to at least advise
participants of relevant law and legal factors because in doing so “[y]ou’re not giving them
legal advice, you’re telling them what’s in the statute and what the law provides. You’re
not giving an opinion as to the law or as to its merits. I guess if you take it further and
start analyzing the statute or interpreting the statute, you may get into trouble”).
11. See id. at 928 (comments of Lawrence M. Watson, Jr.) (observing that the evalua-
tion of party positions is permissible and useful and “becomes dangerous only when you
start taking the decisionmaking process away from the parties”); id. at 922 (comments of
Jeffrey W. Stempel) (noting that if the mediator provides an assessment of the merits of
an issue or the likely adjudication outcome too early in the mediation process, it may warp
the process and preclude the opportunity for a mutual resolution by the parties); id. at 928
(comments of Donna Gebhart) (approving nonevaluative techniques of alerting the parties
and raising their consciousness as a required prelude to offering an assessment of posi-
tion, circumstances, or possible outcomes).
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dangerous to certain parties. When mediation is mandatory, these
potential defects of the false dichotomy cause heightened concern.
B.   The Perils of Formalist Characterization
Related to the problem of the false dichotomy is the formalist ap-
plication of the either/or construct. If, for example, one adopts as a
first premise the view that mediation is by definition nonevaluative,
and then rigidly applies this premise to issues of appropriate media-
tor behavior, the result is a formalist system that permits mediators
little or no leeway to depart from the nonevaluative style. This sort
of regulatory regimen may satisfy the nonevaluative ethos of some
mediation scholars, but it does so at the risk of becoming a rigid sys-
tem that prevents mediators from taking practical actions most ap-
propriate to the cases they mediate.
A formal regulatory regimen also has the uncomfortable air of
tautology and self-fulfilling prophecy. For example, if as the first leg
of a syllogism one posits that “all mediation is nonevaluative and fa-
cilitative only,” any situation of arguably evaluative or intervention-
ist mediation becomes “nonmediation” or “improper mediation” when
the syllogism is carried to conclusion. This not only results in an ex-
cessively narrow view of mediation, but also creates a regulatory re-
gime that discourages flexible, hybrid approaches to dispute resolu-
tion. At its extreme, the “mediation is nonevaluative” mantra be-
comes an end in itself and loses sight of the ultimate goal of media-
tion or any other ADR technique: the efficient and just resolution of
controversy. When the end instead becomes the preservation of a
particular model of mediation (nonevaluative), attainment of this
goal may overwhelm the more germane objective of just dispute
resolution.
To attempt to illustrate my concerns and criticisms, I want to fo-
cus primarily on a hypothetical that touches on a major criticism of
mediation: the possibility that it disserves women,12 weaker parties,
and less assertive entities.13 I will also refer to two other hypotheti-
                                                                                                                   
12. See, e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics
of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441, 444-46 (1992) (suggesting that mediation’s elimination or
de-emphasis of legal rights in pursuit of resolution disadvantages the typical woman in a
domestic dispute due to the imbalance of power); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1549-51 (1991) (contending that more in-
formal processes of mediation may discourage women disputants from asserting legal
rights and encourage mediators to overlook such rights in seeking resolution of domestic
matters). Both of these authors, however, are critical of both evaluative and facilitative
mediation: an evaluative mediator might bludgeon a more pliable party into settlement by
disparaging her case, while a facilitative mediator might encourage her to resolve the
matter quickly, even at substantial cost to her legal entitlements.
13. See Joseph Singer, Nonjudicial Resolution Mechanisms: The Effects on Justice for
the Poor, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 569, 575 (1979) (“It is generally agreed that mediation
between parties of significantly unequal power is inappropriate.”); see generally RICHARD
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cal mediation situations set forth in the panel discussion: a landlord-
tenant dispute and a personal injury tort action.14
Regarding the family law hypothetical, assume a husband and
wife are divorcing. The husband is a Harvard MBA investment
banker. The wife quit school one year shy of her bachelor’s degree to
work to fund the husband’s graduate education. Just as the husband
began to profit from the capital (including spousal human capital)
investment in the MBA, the couple had two children. The wife
worked at home raising the infants and did not return to either
school or a career. When she raised the possibility of hiring substan-
tial childcare so she might finish her education, the husband insisted
on the benefits of an at-home mother and, despite some initial pro-
test by the wife, prevailed on the issue. The children are now two
and three years old, respectively. The husband has initiated the di-
vorce. The wife is concerned about the future but finds life with the
husband a constant state of tension. She also wants out of the mar-
riage. The wife is also generally exhausted from the rigors of child
rearing. The couple enters mandatory mediation without formal
counsel, and the husband’s settlement offer is laughably low—but
the wife has no idea that the offer is low.
Under this perhaps soap-operatic scenario, what should the good
mediator do? Obviously, determining the “best” mediation strategy
requires more information than this thin hypothetical can provide.
However, the sketch provided suggests to me that some degree of
evaluative mediation is in order. The ridiculousness of the husband’s
opening offer cannot go unrebutted. As long as the mediator operates
within an acceptable range of discretion, procedure should be the
mediator’s choice, whether by commenting to one or both parties, in-
sisting on counsel, or leading the parties either individually or col-
lectively through a series of analyses designed to establish the ap-
propriate parameters for dividing property and providing for ali-
                                                                                                                   
ABELLED, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (1982) (various contributors arguing that
weaker parties do better in more formal disputing systems).
14. See Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 921 (comments of Moderator James J. Al-
fini):
The first scenario I’d like to present [to the panel] is basically one you would
find in the county courts in Florida. It’s a landlord-tenant dispute. It’s a dis-
pute over the withholding of rent until an unsafe condition in an apartment is
fixed up. Both parties, as is the case in most county mediations, are unrepre-
sented. Both the landlord is unrepresented, and the tenant is unrepresented.
See also id. at 928 (comments of Dean Alfini):
Let’s move on to the context in which we generally see the evaluative versus
facilitative issues most clearly framed: big civil case mediation. Here in Flor-
ida, this is circuit court mediation. We have a circuit court mediation, a per-
sonal injury case, and the insurance adjuster is taking a hard line that there is
no liability in this case. The mediator is a retired judge, and he knows, or
thinks he knows that juries almost always find liability in these kinds of cases
in that venue. May he reveal this to the parties?
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mony and child support. Leading the parties through such analyses
may, by implication, reveal the inadequacy and probable bad faith of
the husband’s opening offer.
Although there should probably be a presumptive preference for
requiring mediators to first exhaust facilitative approaches before
turning evaluative, mediators should have some discretion to make
evaluative moves if necessary, and that choice should be given wide
deference by the courts. For example, in the divorce scenario out-
lined above, straining to avoid sounding evaluative may needlessly
prolong the process or provide opportunities for the husband to sim-
ply obfuscate. Further, even if the mediator begins by indirectly at-
tempting to spur the wife toward making or obtaining a more realis-
tic assessment of the husband’s position, she may not understand or
appreciate the significance of the indirect approach. At some point,
the good mediator should be permitted to be blunt with the wife and
tell her that the husband’s offer is far lower than any imaginable
court-ordered financial settlement.15
                                                                                                                   
15. In his professional responsibility casebook, Professor Stephen Gillers uses a
similar hypothetical to prompt discussion regarding the lawyer’s duty to settle a claim in
the manner desired by the client, even though the lawyer thinks the proposal is com-
pletely inadequate and unfair to the client. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 85-86 (4th ed. 1995) [hereinafter GILLERS,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS] (“Accept the Offer” problem); see also STEPHEN GILLERS,
TEACHER’S MANUAL FOR REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 40 (4th
ed. 1995) [hereinafter GILLERS, TEACHER’S MANUAL] (commentary on problem). In the hy-
pothetical, a matrimonial lawyer is faced with
a low-ball offer, in the ballpark for first offers but low and obviously an invita-
tion for a counteroffer. I presented the offer to [the client] because I’m sup-
posed to and told her not to be offended it’s so low . . . . What she said next
blew me away. “Take it.” She doesn’t want to negotiate, not even if she as-
sumes—as I told her based on my experience she should—that I can get an-
other $250,000 on the property division and $35,000 a year more on the sup-
port. Maybe more.
GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS, supra, at 86.
Professor Gillers concludes that the lawyer may continue to advise the client, implore
her not to settle so quickly, and even withdraw (pursuant to Model Rule of Professional
Responsibility 1.16(b)(3)) because he finds the client’s decision “repugnant or imprudent.”
GILLERS, TEACHER’S MANUAL, supra, at 40. The lawyer may not, however, obstruct or
sabotage the settlement if the duly informed client continues to insist on the low-ball of-
fer.
Although mediators are not lawyers and do not represent the parties (and therefore
should not give “legal advice” to the parties), it seems incongruous that a mediator who
presides over the case due to court order has, under the facilitative model, so little discre-
tion to attempt to prevent foolish settlements. The lawyer can not only advise the client,
but also can fire a warning shot across the client’s metaphorical bow by threatening to
withdraw. The mediator can withdraw but not advise. Undoubtedly, the mediator can also
ask the probing questions noted in the text. At some point, however, probing questions
may become tantamount to advice or evaluation. Fans of the facilitative model would for-
bid this. I would not only endorse it in situations such as the lopsided divorce-settlement
hypothetical, but would also urge that mediators be permitted to leapfrog the indirect ap-
proach, at least when a disputant has no counsel or has inadequate counsel. Ultimately,
however, the mediator, like the lawyer or judge, probably must permit competent parties
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Of course, if the mediator’s conduct unfairly favors one side or
otherwise results in injustice, courts should police the mediation
process by setting aside or modifying agreements tainted by im-
proper mediation. Nevertheless, mediation is not improper simply
because it contains evaluative components. On the contrary, as this
brief example underscores, nonevaluative mediation can improperly
assist injustice. By simply “facilitating” the hypothetical divorce
without editorial comment, the mediator is giving tacit legitimacy to
the husband’s efforts to unfairly impoverish his spouse and children
in a manner no court would tolerate.16
The standard facilitative response to this scenario—and it is a
good one—posits that the good mediator first tries to raise party
awareness and permit the parties to obtain evaluative expertise.
Parties are advised of the right to legal counsel, or are even urged to
get counsel.17 The parties are encouraged to grasp the implications
that would become apparent if an evaluation occurred through the
mediator asking, for example, whether the wife has thought about
the children’s college educations, private versus public primary and
secondary school, family vacations, summer camps, childcare while
she seeks to return to work, tuition if she finishes or continues col-
lege training, and so on. Although these techniques may be very ef-
fective in most mediations, they may be woefully ineffective in deal-
ing with party imbalances of power, sophistication, or funding, par-
ticularly in the case of spouse driven by guilt, exhaustion, frustra-
tion, or impatience. Suggesting that a party seek out a lawyer may
salve the mediator’s conscience and that of the system as well, but
this does little real good when a party irrationally resists legal coun-
sel, or when poverty or time pressure preclude legal advice or result
in substandard legal advice.
The anti-war bromide of the 1960s that “not to decide is to decide”
remains apt, whatever one’s historical views of U.S. foreign policy.
When mediators are too studiously “neutral,” there exists significant
                                                                                                                   
to enter into even foolish settlements, unless the proposed agreement is not just unwise
but unconscionable.
16. At least I hope no court would tolerate it, although the settlement might be
deemed unwise but not unconscionable or violative of public policy. If the settlement im-
perils the children’s well-being, a court would presumably have authority to reject it (if in
midtrial) or modify it on later motion. Whatever the trial court’s decision, it would be
subject to reasonably rigorous appellate review that would be likely to correct at least
gross errors of law, procedure, or equitable distribution. By contrast, judicial review of
private settlements or mediated settlements is highly deferential. A court at either the
trial or appellate level is unlikely to disturb any but the most facially unconscionable me-
diated settlements.
17. See Craig A. McEwen et. al, Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Ap-
proaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1322-23,
1358-62 (1995) (concluding that the presence of attorneys substantially reduces the possi-
bility that one party will take advantage of the other in family law mediation).
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danger that they will favor the stronger, more sophisticated, meaner,
or more deceptive party. Proponents of the facilitative approach tend
to ignore or underappreciate this aspect of disputing activity. For
example, Professor Lela Love criticizes the evaluative approach be-
cause
[i]n mediation, little protection exists from a mediator’s inade-
quately informed opinion. . . . The mediator’s opinion that one of
the parties should buy a carpet to lessen the impact of sounds
heard by a neighbor or that one of the parties does not have
standing to bring a particular claim in court carries enormous
weight.18
However, the mediator’s silence also carries enormous weight. When
the parties announce a settlement, the mediator’s lack of editorial
comment or other activity (other than wrapping up the case) sug-
gests to the parties that their settlement falls within the legal sys-
tem’s zone of acceptability. If our hypothetical wife being taken to
the financial cleaners by her investment-banker husband had any
misgivings about the adequacy of his proposed settlement, those
misgivings are effectively erased when the mediator—on the case be-
cause of the coercive power of the state—tacitly blesses the settle-
ment. Professor Love and others are correct in highlighting the need
to supervise the mediator’s influence through action, but they err in
overlooking the mediator’s influence through inaction.
An illustrative, if absurd, example underscores the point. Imagine
mediating between Pol Pot and Mother Theresa,19 with neither rep-
resented by counsel.20 Can anyone seriously suggest that the pure fa-
cilitative model, applied with inflexible formalism, is really the ap-
propriate approach? (“You know, Mother Theresa, there may be
some legal issues in this case and you might want to consult a law-
yer, but otherwise if you and Mr. Pot want to agree that all relief aid
                                                                                                                   
18. Love, supra note 8, at 942-43.
19. This scene should probably be avoided by the statutory authority of courts to di-
rect disputes away from mediation when it is deemed futile. Stranger things have hap-
pened, however. See Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Ad-
judicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1808, 1809-11 (1986) (describing a failed victim-offender mediation attempt involving
mugging victim Bernhard Goetz, who later became notorious for the shooting of men in-
timidating him on a New York City subway train); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of
Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1273
(1994) (finding victim-offender mediation widespread but ill-advised in criminal matters).
20. When disputants have competent counsel, many of the concerns attending media-
tion or any other form of dispute resolution are greatly allayed. See McEwen, supra note
17, at 1322-23, 1346-47, 1358-62 (concluding that potential unfairness due to imbalances
of power or sophistication are greatly reduced when parties have counsel). Unfortunately,
a high percentage of parties participating in court-mandated ADR do so without lawyers.
See id. at 1344-52; see also Nolan-Haley, supra note 5, at 82-83, 94-95 (noting that many
or perhaps most disputants in mandatory mediation participate without counsel).
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stops at the border and is delivered to Khmer Rouge soldiers, then
we have a settlement.”21) To be sure, a facilitative mediator may en-
able these two disputants to reach an agreement, but will the
agreement be sufficiently fair that the judicial system should em-
brace it?22 
In my view, even the commentators most associated with the fa-
cilitative and nonevaluative perspective23 recognize this when ap-
plying their model of facilitative mediation to situations of unequal
parties or strategic behavior.24 Similarly, proponents of the evalua-
tive mediation approach realize that mediation becomes a charade if
the first meeting of the parties results in an immediate decree by the
mediator.25 Consequently, the debate in the literature is more com-
plex than can be captured by the “facilitative versus evaluative” de-
                                                                                                                   
21. Jim Alfini, graciously commenting on this Article, found the hypothetical jarring
and over-the-top in its absurdity. Although his grasp of reality is probably better than
mine, I disagree with Alfini: if we had better information about characteristics of the par-
ties, I predict we would find many mismatches between a disputant who is essentially fair
and one who is ruthlessly selfish. Part of the lawyer’s role is to level the playing field.
For a dispiriting example of attempted facilitative mediation when the parties are im-
balanced in resources and attitude, see Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth’s Story: Exploring
Power Imbalances in Divorce Mediation, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 553 (1995). Notwith-
standing legal representation, the wife in this divorce saga appears not to have received
either full justice or adequate voluntary resolution. See id. at 595:
Under the laws of many states, attorneys have an ethical duty to advise cli-
ents about alternative dispute resolution. Although I would have advised
Elizabeth about mediation, I would not have recommended it.
. . . [F]avorable indicators [for a positive outcome] began to melt away during
mediation as the ugly presence of the power imbalance between [her husband]
Paul and Elizabeth, seemingly dormant, began to reappear from deep within
the relationship. Even with the help of her attorney and accountant, Elizabeth
could not overcome Paul’s power. The push to settle, the persuasive presence
of the mediator, and the non-confrontational atmosphere conspired to render
Elizabeth impotent against Paul. As the mediation progressed, Paul was more
and more competitive and Elizabeth was increasingly cooperative, uncondi-
tionally so.
22. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (suggesting
that even fair settlements may disserve justice by preventing full and public adjudication
of controversies). Professor Fiss is clearly correct in noting that settlement resolutions are
not necessarily wise or just. However, he is incorrect to the extent he suggests that adju-
dication is inevitably a preferred alternative. Courts render plenty of injustice. Disputants
should be entitled to avoid or minimize these instances by exiting the system through set-
tlement, provided that the settlement, even if unwise, is not coerced or unconscionable.
When ADR is court-ordered, courts must be sensitive to the coercion issue lurking simply
because the parties have been ordered to mediate, arbitrate, or obtain a third-party
evaluation.
23. See, e.g., BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 7, at 18-21; see also Kimberlee K. Kovach &
Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 31, 31-33 (1996).
24. For example, Bush and Folger, although stressing facilitation, also emphasize the
need to empower the parties and prompt them to recognize the concerns of one another.
They also advise mediators to note and compensate for differential power relationships.
See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 7, at 70-85.
25. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 922 (comments of Jeffrey W. Stem-
pel); id. at 924 (comments of Lawrence M. Watson, Jr.).
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scription, and panel discussions such as the present exchange in-
variably result in more refined analyses of specific situations with
“evaluators” and “facilitators” differing relatively little in the con-
crete strategies they employ or advocate for presiding over particular
situations.26 For example, in her article in this symposium, Professor
Lela Love, clearly a proponent of the facilitative approach and a
critic of evaluation, deems it good facilitative mediation when
“[m]ediators push disputing parties to question their assumptions,
reconsider their positions, and listen to each other’s perspectives,
stories and arguments. The urge the parties to consider relevant law ,
weigh their own values, principles and priorities, and develop an op-
timal outcome. In so doing, mediators facilitate evaluation by the
parties.”27 The activities Professor Love describes obviously have an
evaluative dimension as well as a facilitative and empowering mis-
sion; these activities simply steer clear of the heavy-handed evalua-
tion that fundamentally alters the mediation enterprise.
III.   FLORIDA’S REIFICATION OF THE FORMALIST FALSE DICHOTOMY
Unfortunately, Florida mediation law appears not to be so supple.
Although the statutory language does not require a complete ban on
evaluative mediation, the statute and the rules have been inter-
preted to mean codification of a rigidly facilitative perspective in
which mediators are absolutely forbidden from expressing a view re-
garding the merits of the dispute. Florida’s mediation statute defines
mediation as “a process whereby a neutral third person called a me-
diator acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dispute be-
tween two or more parties.”28 The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure speak to the logisti-
cal administration of the mediation and even to such matters as
compensation of the mediators. However, the Rules say nothing re-
garding the appropriate mediation style beyond simply defining the
general principal that mediation is the facilitation of a party-driven
agreement.
The Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators
are somewhat more specific. However, these Rules are largely pat-
terned on the statutory language and thus contain a similar facilita-
tive slant, although they do not textually foreclose some degree of
helpful evaluation in the service of mediation. Arguably, the statute
and the Rules, if properly interpreted, encourage flexibility and a
                                                                                                                   
26. See generally Panel Discussion, supra note 3 (despite ideological differences
among participants, general concerns existed regarding appropriate mediator behavior in
concrete situations).
27. Love, supra note 8, at 939 (emphasis added).
28. FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2) (1995).
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broad notion of facilitation that encompasses use of evaluative tech-
niques in appropriate circumstances. Specifically, the Rules state:
Mediation Defined. Mediation is a process whereby a neutral
third party acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dis-
pute without prescribing what it should be. It is an informal and
nonadversarial process with the objective of helping the disputing
parties reach a mutually acceptable agreement.29
. . . .
General Principles. Mediation is based on principles of commu-
nication, negotiation, facilitation, and problem-solving that em-
phasize:
(1) the needs and interests of the participants;
(2) fairness;
(3) procedural flexibility;
(4) privacy and confidentiality;
(5) full disclosure; and
(6) self determination.30
In addition to noting fairness as an essential principle of media-
tion, the Rules contain other language suggesting that the facilita-
tive notion of mediation need not exclude an evaluative component.
For example, the role of the mediator as defined in the Rules “in-
cludes but is not limited to” the generally facilitative techniques of
assisting the parties to identify issues, improve communication, ex-
plore alternative resolutions, and assist the parties to reach “volun-
tary” agreements.31 If this broad language and the notion of a genu-
inely voluntary accord is treated seriously, mediation under the
Florida Rules should not forbid activist mediation that occasionally
takes an evaluative turn, particularly if this evaluation is done to
further fairness.
Other provisions in the Rules buttress this assessment. For ex-
ample, mediators “shall promote mutual respect among the parties
throughout the mediation process.”32 In addition, the mediators “shall
not unnecessarily or inappropriately prolong a mediation session if it
becomes apparent that the case is unsuitable for mediation or if one
or more of the parties is unwilling or unable to participate in the
mediation process in a meaningful manner.”33 The mixed message of
                                                                                                                   
29. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS Rule 10.020(b) (preamble) (emphasis
added); see also FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2) (1995).
30. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.020(d) (emphasis added).
31. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.020(c).
32. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.060(f) (wording of the self-
determination article of the Rules).
33. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.050(b) (providing that the “mediator
shall assist the parties in evaluating the benefits, risks, and costs of mediation and alter-
native methods of problem solving available to them”).
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mediation philosophy is to some extent encapsulated in the commit-
tee note to Rule 10.060 (Self-Determination), which provides:
While a mediator has no duty to specifically advise a party as to
the legal ramifications or consequences of a proposed agreement,
there is a duty for the mediator to advise the parties of the impor-
tance of understanding such matters and giving them the opportu-
nity to seek such advice if they desire.34
In other words, because court-ordered mediation is nonbinding,
the mediator must advise the parties regarding the gravity of set-
tling a dispute that would otherwise be subject to litigation and the
tacit advisability of obtaining appropriate legal advice.35 However,
the mediator is not required to advise the parties regarding even a
one-sided settlement on which they appear to be embarking. Al-
though the committee note expresses a useful sentiment and cer-
tainly does not foreclose the mediator from registering evaluative
sentiments in the interests of avoiding unfairness, it continues to en-
courage use of the facilitative model of mediation in Florida.
For example, a mediator is unlikely to ever be censured for
standing idly by while the wife in the divorce hypothetical sells her
future and that of her children down the river, as long as the media-
tor has given at least a boilerplate disclaimer at the start of the me-
diation.36
The most express recognition of fairness dangers in mediation is
found in section 44.102, Florida Statutes , which provides that “[a]
court shall not refer any case to mediation if it finds there has been a
significant history of domestic abuse that would compromise the me-
diation process.”37 Presumably, all such instances would be found to
undermine mediation, and therefore courts would not refer domestic
relations matters to mediation when there has been spousal or child
abuse. However, “abuse” per se hardly exhausts the lists of power,
attitude, and fairness concerns that attend mediation. For example,
in the hypothetical divorce of the investment banker and the home-
maker, I posit that there has been no “abuse” as the term is com-
monly understood.38 Nonetheless, the wife is clearly more vulnerable
                                                                                                                   
34. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.060 committee note.
35. See id.
36. For example: “Settlement of a legal dispute is an important event and becomes no
less important because the settlement results from a mediated agreement. Any settlement
you make as a result of this mediation will be legally binding and will conclude the matter
at issue. You may take time to consult with a lawyer or other professionals prior to
agreeing to any settlement that comes up during your mediation efforts.”
37. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(2)(b) (Supp. 1996).
38. I realize that many observers would characterize it as abusive for a spouse to es-
sentially slough off all child rearing onto the other spouse and devote available time to
earning money and developing a career while the other spouse performs nanny operations
at the expense of her own education and career. Without taking a position on this issue, I
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and dependent. In a more informal setting, many commentators fear
that she will be unlikely to stand up for her rights or even those of
her children. If the mediator simply lubricates a settlement discus-
sion, this could result in a substantially unfair settlement because of
the absence of substantive legal evaluation by the mediator.
Although the language of the statutes and Rules is susceptible to
permitting a wide range of mediation styles, it has been interpreted
to require that mediators refrain from saying or doing anything that
could be construed as evaluative. Florida’s Mediator Qualifications
Advisory Panel is occasionally asked to respond to questions posed
by certified mediators. Advisory Panel opinions from 1995 reveal a
highly restrictive Panel view of mediation—one that appears to for-
bid even isolated, minor, and useful evaluative action by mediators.39
For example, in Advisory Panel opinion 95-002, the hypothetical
considered involved a creditor’s collection action against a debtor for
$1250, an amount the debtor admits owing, but for which she wishes
to arrange a graduated repayment schedule, offering to pay $110 per
month, an amount the creditor is readily willing to accept without
pursuing the matter to judgment.40 However, the note signed by the
debtor provides for an effective interest rate of 29.5% per year, while
the prevailing post-judgment interest rate is eight percent per year.
The creditor has, of course, been through these sorts of disputes be-
fore. The debtor is generally naïve about the law. In the hallway
prior to the mediation session, the mediator overheard the creditor
suggesting to the debtor that she should avoid a judgment “because
it would hurt her credit.”41
The Advisory Panel then considered whether the mediator could
ask the debtor (question 95-002A in the Panel’s classification sys-
tem): “Are you aware that the monthly payments do not cover the in-
terest as it is accruing and you will be paying on this loan forever?”42
and (question 95-002B) “[A]re you aware that if a judgment [was] en-
tered against you, the interest would be reduced from 29.5% to
8%?”43 The Panel declined to give an opinion as to (question 95-002C)
whether making the interest rate comparison would be “interfering
                                                                                                                   
am using “abuse” to refer to more distinct and focused mistreatment of a spouse or child
by the other spouse, such as physical violence or sustained verbal attack or other psycho-
logical abuse. This connotation of abuse, which I believe to be that generally held by
judges, would not apply to cases such as the investment banker’s divorce and to other do-
mestic relations matters in which nonevaluative mediation poses significant issues of
fairness and tacit coercion.
39. See Risette Posey, Latest MQAP Advisory Opinions, RESOL. REP., Oct. 1995, at 2
(Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel Op. 95-002); id. at 14 (Mediator Qualifications
Advisory Panel Op. 95-005).
40. See id. at 2 (Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel Op. 95-002).
41. Id.
42. Id. (emphasis omitted).
43. Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).
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with a contractual relationship,” finding this a legal determination
outside the scope of the Panel’s authority.44 In addition, the Panel
considered (question 95-002D) whether a mediator’s potential “ques-
tion [can] be asked even if the framing of the question tends to ad-
vise or inform one or both of the parties involved?”45 
The Panel essentially ruled that all such activity by the mediator
violated Florida’s prohibition against mediators providing legal ad-
vice. In particular, the Panel even found the mediator’s action in
question A to be unethical in that the “you will be paying on this
loan forever” statement was a misrepresentation46 and that simply
advising the naïve debtor (question B) of the prevailing interest rate
on judgments “violat[ed] the prohibition relating to the provision of
legal advice.”47 In response to question D, the Panel stated that “[i]t
is improper for a mediator to provide legal advice by any method”
during the mediation—even the innocuous act of questioning a party
to determine whether the party is taking foolish action with a mini-
mal understanding of the law and the legal ramifications of the ac-
tion.48 In particular, the Panel found that a mediator question “de-
signed to advise the party about her legal options, a role that is ap-
propriate for an attorney, [is] inappropriate for a mediator”49 and
that “[i]t is improper for a mediator to provide legal advice by any
method within the scope of a mediation, whether such advice be by
statement, question or any other form of communication.”50
                                                                                                                   
44. Id. (emphasis omitted).
45. Id. (emphasis omitted).
46. Although the “you’ll be paying forever” statement is, of course, not literally true
for a relatively small debt (even at 30% annual interest, monthly payments of $110 will
extinguish the debt in about 18 months, at a total approaching twice the outstanding debt
principal), a more charitable Panel might have interpreted the mediator’s comment as a
figure of speech. “You’ll be paying forever” can be construed simply to suggest that the in-
terest payments will be out of proportion to the debt if repayment occurs on a limited
piecemeal basis under a high interest rate. If the debt had been $112,500 instead of $1250,
and the settlement provided for $11,250 per month payments by the debtor, the media-
tor’s statement about proportionality would be even more telling. On balance, however,
this type of comment is both too exaggerated and too evaluative to be permitted absent
compelling circumstances not reflected in the hypothetical.
47. Posey, supra note 39, at 3 (summary of Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel
Op. 95-002).
48. Id. at 5.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 5. The Panel did provide something of an escape valve for the pressure felt
by the mediator in this hypothetical situation:
The mediator may, however, often obtain the desired information if the ques-
tion is framed more generally. . . . by asking the following: ‘Is interest levied on
a judgment? Do either of you know?’ These two questions set the stage for the
parties to provide information to the mediator and to each other without plac-
ing the mediator in the position of providing that information. In so doing, the
mediator assists in maximizing the exploration of alternatives, and adheres to
the principles of fairness, full disclosure, self determination, and the needs and
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Although the issues of interpreting the law51 and the Rules are
reasonably close, I believe the Panel opinion was in error and took
an excessively restrictive view of mediator discretion under Florida
law.52 The statute prohibits a mediator’s giving of “legal advice,” an
admittedly malleable term, but hardly one that requires the expan-
sive definition placed upon it by the Panel. As a law professor, like
most lawyers, I am frequently asked about legal problems by stu-
dents and friends. Although I have yet to agree to represent any of
them (and could not do so in Florida without obtaining pro hac vice
admission because I am a member of the Minnesota bar), I feel com-
pelled as a teacher or friend to at least alert them to the apparent le-
gal issues and to inform them of sources of information, potential
counsel, and so on. Am I practicing law? Not at all (although some
older vintage lawyers might assert it). Am I giving legal advice? Only
in the broadest sense. Calling these sorts of informal conversations,
performed without retainer, fee, specific research, memorialized
work product, accepted assignment, or client control, legal advice is
akin to calling it investment advice if I suggest to my retiree father
that perhaps he should reconsider his commitment to the Fidelity
Magellan mutual fund (although this popular investment vehicle is
doing better of late). If one is hyperliteral, I suppose my uninspired
idea that Dad look at other investment vehicles is financial advice,
although I don’t expect a guest appearance on Wall Street Week with
Louis Rukeyser anytime soon.
In much the same way, the Panel’s broad definition of “legal ad-
vice” by a mediator is defensible but extreme. It serves the text of the
statute but not its purpose. The purpose of the prohibition, of course,
is to prevent the mediator from choosing sides, playing favorites, in-
terfering with party-lawyer relations,53 or impeding voluntary reso-
                                                                                                                   
interests of the participants [Rule 10.020(d)(1), (2), (5)], while honoring the
commitment to all parties to move toward an agreement [Rule 10.070(a)].
Id.
51. See FLA. STAT. ch. 44 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
52. The Panel opinion is also regarded as extreme by Professor Moberly, an architect
of the Florida mediation system, but someone with more agnosticism about evaluation
than me. See Moberly, supra note 2 (evaluation permissible as last resort if even-handed);
see also Robert B. Moberly, Ethical Standards for Court-Appointed Mediators and Flor-
ida’s Mandatory Mediation Experiment, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 701, 712-15 (1994) (stating
that mediators may evaluate but must remain impartial).
53. Despite their professed commitment to the moral high ground of noninterference,
facilitative mediators are vulnerable on this score. For example, many mediators have
taken to referring to the disputing parties as the mediator’s “clients” or “principals” rather
than merely the disputants who have retained the mediator. Although this characteriza-
tion is touching in its connotative closeness, it misperceives the relationship. A disputant
does not use a mediator as an “agent” in the way in which clients or other principals use
lawyers or representatives as agents. In addition, of course, the party has no particular
claim to the mediator’s zealous advocacy (far from it). The mediator has a duty to serve
the parties and the situation in the aggregate rather than to represent either party as such.
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lution through needless, legalistic Monday-morning quarterbacking.
As long as the mediator is not frustrating the purpose of the statute
through these or similar tactics, the Panel (and the Florida dispute
resolution establishment) should accord the statutory limit on “legal
advice” the sort of constrained, common-sense view that we as law-
yers would employ when determining whether our communications
rise to the level of providing representation or services. Alerting dis-
putants to potential pitfalls and fairness concerns, even if done
through very specific questions or comments (rather than the gen-
eral questions endorsed by the Panel) should not be roundly forbid-
den as impermissible legal advice.
Notwithstanding my disagreement, however, the Panel’s legal de-
termination is at least debatable. Yet even if the Panel’s opinion cor-
rectly interpreted Florida mediation law and procedure, it is a disas-
ter as a matter of public policy. In so broadly construing the notion of
legal advice and constraining the mediator, the Panel appears to
have elevated the formalist “facilitative” model of mediation above
the practical needs of disputants and the fairness concerns that
must animate decisionmaking in any government-sponsored pro-
ceeding.
Consider, for example, the practical effect of the Panel’s ruling in
the creditor-debtor case from which the opinion sprang. If the media-
tor follows Panel protocol and does not raise the interest rate com-
parison issue, the debtor blindly agrees to a settlement that is more
onerous than standing by and permitting a default judgment. In ad-
dition, a debtor with limited funds also poses a collection problem for
the creditor, especially when the debt is small. A more sophisticated
debtor or one represented by counsel might use this leverage to ex-
tract a better settlement from the creditor (e.g., “We can cash this
out now for $800 [hidden in a client’s mattress rather than a gar-
nishable bank account] or you can spend a few hundred in counsel
fees and other collection costs trying to get all $1250 out of my cli-
ent—and you may not succeed”). Although the settlement is no
panacea for the creditor (the debtor may still default on the $110-
per-month payments), the debtor clearly has made a worse deal than
that available to her in the absence of mediation. By failing to raise
the interest rate comparison, the mediator has allowed the debtor to
obtain demonstrably less in mediation than was available through
litigation or other forms of ADR. By raising the interest rate com-
parison, the mediator would have provided the debtor with the tools
to better gauge the alternatives. The debtor may well have opted for
the resulting settlement in any event to avoid further uncertainty
and inconvenience, but at least she would have been able to make a
more informed decision. The mediator’s comment would have leveled
the playing field, but would not have thwarted genuine voluntary
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resolution by the parties. Although the mediator may have been able
to achieve this benefit with the less evaluative form of question, “Ms.
Debtor, have you consulted a lawyer?,” the answer is likely to be,
“No, I can’t afford one, certainly not one whose fees will be almost as
much as the debt.” At this point, common sense compels one to won-
der why the facilitative charade is necessary. Why not allow the me-
diator, who is on the scene only because the state requires it (for a
debt this small, neither side would be likely to voluntarily seek out
and pay a mediator), to cut to the metaphorical chase and alert the
debtor to the interest-rate pitfall?
The Panel’s absolute prohibition on anything smacking of legal
advice is more problematic. Imagine a variant of the hypothetical.
The creditor and debtor make the same agreement of settlement, but
the creditor insists on securing the repayment plan debt with a secu-
rity interest in the debtor’s home, an asset that would be exempt
from execution to satisfy an ordinary judgment under Florida law.54
However, armed with a security interest, the creditor, like a bank
providing a mortgage, can force the sale of the debtor’s home and ef-
fectively evict the debtor for missing a single $110 payment. To say
the least, it is questionable whether a sophisticated debtor or one
with counsel would accept such a condition of settlement. If the me-
diator says nothing or gives only a general but futile suggestion of
counsel,55 the mediator permits the debtor to strike a deal far worse
than what probably would have resulted if court-ordered mediation
had not forced the parties to “bargain.” If the mediator instead notes
the normal homestead exemption and the impact of granting a secu-
rity interest, the debtor is at least given a chance to make an in-
formed and empowered decision. Aversion to “legal advice” and alle-
giance to a Pollyannic view of the facilitative model should not pre-
vent such reasonable intervention by the mediator.
                                                                                                                   
54. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4. Indeed, Florida law is famous or perhaps infamous in
that the state’s homestead exemption has no limit. A millionaire deadbeat with a $100
million estate and a billion dollars in debts can live in the estate secure in the knowledge
that the creditors may never take any portion of the property. Most notoriously, former
baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn and former Kidder, Peabody investment banker Mar-
tin Siegel, accused of illegal insider training, are generally perceived as having relocated
to Florida when their debt and other legal problems arose to obtain the benefit of the un-
limited homestead exemption. See generally JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF THE MEN WHO PLUNDERED WALL STREET AND THE CHASE THAT
BROUGHT THEM DOWN (1991) (describing Siegel’s move from Connecticut to Florida during
the fallout from the Dennis Levine-Ivan Boesky-Michael Milken insider trading scandals).
55. Even suggesting legal aid counsel may be futile for less sophisticated debtors who
are hesitant to approach lawyers or who, although poor, may fail to meet legal aid guide-
lines for obtaining free legal assistance. See Russell G. Pearce et al., Project, An Assess-
ment of Alternative Strategies for Increasing Access to Legal Services, 90 YALE L.J. 122,
140-45 (1980) (finding, based on a statistical analysis of the ABA-ABF Survey of Legal
Needs of the Public, that the use of lawyers is reduced when individuals have no pre-
existing social or business contact with them).
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Subsequent Panel decisions suggest the Panel continues to cling
to a broad notion of impermissible legal advice and a crabbed notion
of mediator discretion. For example, in opinion 95-005, the Panel
was asked in question 95-005A: “What is the duty of a mediator who
is informed during a caucus of a family (dissolution of marriage) me-
diation that one spouse possesses an asset of which the other spouse
has no knowledge?”56 The Panel stated that “the mediator should
withdraw from the mediation unless the party discloses the asset,”
but suggested that the mediator has no authority to hint to the other
party that further investigation might be in order.57 Although with-
drawal of the mediator is obviously superior to presiding over set-
tlement tainted by fraud, the Panel opinion turns a blind eye to the
likely second round of the dispute. There, a second mediator will
preside over negotiation and probable settlement. This time, the
spouse hiding an asset will be cagey enough not to alert the mediator
and the case will likely settle favorably for the deceptive spouse. At
this point, one wonders why mediation communications must be so
privileged. If a judge found out about incipient fraud, would the only
remedy be withdrawal rather than disclosing the hidden asset on
grounds similar to the crime-fraud exception to the confidentiality of
attorney-client communications? Although this issue is complex and
beyond the scope of this Article, the Panel’s answer to question A
remains unsatisfying in large part because it envisions a nonactivist
role for the mediator.
The Panel’s answer to question 95-005C is more unsatisfying still.
There, the question was: “Is a mediator who becomes aware that a
plaintiff in a wrongful death action is making no claim for loss of
consortium, which claim would appear to the mediator to be appro-
priate under the circumstances, bound to inform that party of this
matter?”58 The Panel’s response: “[I]t is an ethical violation for a me-
diator to give legal advice to a party.”59 Continuing, the Panel stated:
[I]t is inappropriate for a mediator to give legal advice even if a
party to the mediation is not represented by counsel. If the party is
represented by counsel, which appears to be the case in your sce-
nario, it would be clearly inappropriate to provide such legal ad-
vice. See rules 10.070(a)(1); 10.090(a) & (b).60
Again, the Panel embraces a narrow view of mediation and an exces-
sively broad notion of legal advice. Particularly when a party has
                                                                                                                   
56.  Posey, supra note 39, at 14 (Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel Op. 95-005)
(emphasis omitted).
57. Id. at 15.
58. Id. at 14 (emphasis omitted).
59. Id. at 15.
60. Id. at 16.
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counsel, it hardly seems obstructionist if the mediator simply asks:
“Counsel, did you decide not to make a consortium claim or is it con-
sidered covered by the settlement?” If the plaintiff is pro se (almost a
per se problem with something as serious as a wrongful death ac-
tion), the mediator will need to first provide some legal background,
but the same question would seem equally apt to ensure that the
parties settle with relatively complete knowledge of their options
and the consequences of the settlement. Of course, this alerts the
lawyer or party. This dollop of “legal advice,” however, is but a small
impurity in the facilitative model. In return, the legal system by this
modest mediator intervention acts to minimize unfairness or mis-
take.
In some instances, “evaluative” mediators undoubtedly need to be
reigned in to prevent mediation from being converted to arbitration
and to prevent the evaluative mediator who jumps to conclusions
from bullying one or both parties into an unsatisfactory resolution of
a controversy. Nevertheless, it hardly follows that all evaluative me-
diation is bad and all nonevaluative mediation is good. Students and
most lawyers intuitively appreciate this point. Sometimes, a little bit
of evaluation or some steering of one or both parties toward a rea-
sonable position is required, both to prevent injustice and to facili-
tate settlement.
Speaking of facilitation and evaluation as polar opposites or com-
pletely separate, parallel tracks of dispute resolution oversimplifies
both the world and the analytic model. There really are no purely
“facilitative” actions and purely “evaluative” actions by mediators.
Rather, the effective mediator engages in a range of behaviors that
span the facilitative-evaluative continuum. Some actions (e.g., re-
marking that the husband’s settlement offer falls below the mini-
mum legal standard) are clearly more evaluative. Other actions (e.g.,
asking the wife to detail her future goals for the children and esti-
mating the financial resources required) are more facilitative but
have a clear evaluative agenda. Still others (e.g., suggesting a visit to
a marriage counselor) fit quite snugly within the realm of facilita-
tion.
One’s natural impulse is to speak of the range of mediator activi-
ties as falling along various points of a continuum marked at the poles
by purely evaluative actions (“Mr. Husband, your offer is ludicrously
low. You must want to litigate this matter rather than settle it.”) and
nearly purely facilitative techniques (“Mr. Husband and Ms. Wife,
what is it that’s troubling you about your marriage?”).61 However, the
                                                                                                                   
61. Of course, efforts to encourage the parties to discuss their feelings do not inevita-
bly provide positive catharsis. For example, if a marriage is fraught with conflict and an-
ger, airing those feelings may only make the parties more confrontational, impeding fur-
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continuum metaphor, although common and thus comfortable, is not
really accurate. Describing mediator conduct as a continuum yields
too greatly to the false dichotomy. Many mediation actions are not
compromises between the evaluative and facilitative poles of the di-
chotomy, but are instead actions not fully susceptible of categoriza-
tion within either school of thought. The same or similar actions may
be either essentially facilitative or primarily evaluative, depending
on the context of the dispute.
IV.   THE BENEFITS OF ECLECTIC FLEXIBILITY
A.   A Page of History . . . Or Reinventing the Flat Tire
Modern society is, of course, more than a bit dissatisfied with liti-
gation. Understandably, this antipathy toward litigation fuels much
of the modern ADR movement. However, the admitted shortcomings
of traditional litigation are just that—shortcomings. They are not
indicative of an adjudicatory system rotten to the core. Conse-
quently, a society interested in effective dispute resolution would
presumably pay some attention to effective case resolution behaviors
exhibited by judges. Among the most effective means of resolving dis-
putes is the establishment of an early and firm trial date (which forces
the parties to sharpen their respective pencils and talk settlement).
Although the resolute trial date is not something most mediators
would characterize as facilitative activity, it in a sense functions as the
ultimate facilitative strategy, one that forces the parties to cooperate if
they wish to avoid the rigors and risks of final adjudication.
Another effective judicial technique of case resolution is cajoling
of settlement through informal conferencing with the parties, often
after establishing some guides regarding likely case outcomes
through pretrial rulings on particular claims, availability of informa-
tion, or admissibility of evidence. In performing this role of a “set-
tlement judge,” effective jurists alternately operate as both evaluat-
ors and facilitators in nudging litigants toward settlement. This
strategy and the alternating evaluative-hybrid-facilitative tactics of
the judge appear to bring about fair, effective, and lasting settle-
ments. If there were enough such judges on the bench, the modern
ADR movement might never have blossomed.
In reality, however, not all judges are good settlement judges
(some are too arbitrary, some are too wishy-washy, some are too inef-
ficient, and some are too unwilling to put in the time), and there are
                                                                                                                   
ther mediation and settlement. Sending husband and wife to a marriage counselor is un-
doubtedly a facilitative strategy, but it may not lead to cooperation if during the course of
venting their frustrations, husband and wife lose whatever remaining reservoir of good-
will they possessed when first entering mediation.
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not nearly enough judges to quickly address the thousands of dis-
putes in the judicial pipelines of state and federal courts.62 Conse-
quently, some delegation to ADR mechanisms seems inevitable. Just
the same, adherents of either a facilitative or an evaluative approach
would do well to realize that the flexible and eclectic behavior of
many of the most successful American judges fits neither model, al-
though, in my view, the best judges lean toward the evaluative side
of the scale. Rather than merely drawing out the parties’ positions,
effective judges usually provide some guidance to the parties re-
garding the range of trial outcomes (e.g., “We’ve never had a punitive
damages verdict of six figures that’s held up on appeal”) or otherwise
put evaluative pressure on the parties (e.g., denying the defendant’s
motion to strike the plaintiff ’s punitive damages claim).
At the risk of posing a question that many regard as passé, I must
ask: Why, in designing and operating ADR programs intended to re-
lieve the pressure on the court, would our disputing system insist
that these ADR methods ignore the judicial dispute resolution tactics
that have proven successful in the past? Of course, some of the an-
swer is that part of the mission of the ADR movement is to provide
choices to the parties that are unavailable in litigation. Surely, how-
ever, an equally important basis of the ADR movement is encourag-
ing the least expensive and timeliest settlement possible that also
meets minimum criteria of fairness. This ADR rationale would pre-
sumably be well-served by mimicking to some degree the judicial set-
tlement techniques that work, techniques that seem to me to com-
bine both the facilitative and the evaluative approach.
My suggestion that mediation learn from judicial settlement bro-
kering rather than spurn it does not really address another justifica-
tion of ADR: providing greater disputing variety than is available
through adjudication. This ADR goal is obviously important—but it
can be realized by voluntary actions by the parties, particularly more
sophisticated parties. For example, if two patent disputants want to
have the matter addressed by a panel of Nobel laureates rendering
detailed technical findings of fact, they can so stipulate and exit the
judicial system or government-annexed ADR systems such as Flor-
ida’s court-ordered mediation. Similarly, if they wanted to ensure
maximum mutual profitability without deciding the question of in-
ventorship, they could opt for a task force of economists and mar-
keting experts, who would craft a revenue sharing plan for the com-
                                                                                                                   
62. See COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 8-13 (1995) (finding that from 1904 to 1990,
the federal appellate caseload alone increased 3868% while the number of appellate
judges increased from 27 to 167 (in 1994) and that the civil case load alone has increased
by more than 1400% since 1960, making it practically impossible for the judicial system to
resolve cases swiftly and on a steady basis).
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peting devices (including, no doubt, some lawyers on the task force to
consider the antitrust implications).
Disputants should, of course, possess varied ADR options. How-
ever, when ADR is court-ordered, such as it is in Florida’s mediation
system or the court-annexed arbitration found in many federal and
state courts,63 the need is not so much for variety as it is for depend-
ability, effectiveness, and fairness. When, pursuant to judicial order,
a party is forced to mediate,64 the form of mediation employed should
retain the useful characteristics of the adjudication for which it sub-
stitutes. If “forced” to adjudicate rather than mediate, the parties
may of course have differing resources, sophistication, and tem-
perament. The stronger, smarter, or meaner party may extract a
premium settlement from its opponent. When this occurs, however,
it is the result of private bargaining that, no matter how unfair the
outcome, the judicial system normally leaves undisturbed.65 Thus,
disputants who never enter the government-operated adjudication
system or who exit that system prior to final judgment may normally
make any settlement they choose, however foolish the settlement for
one or more of the disputants.66 The courts/government take no posi-
tion on most settlements and refrain from interfering with most set-
tlements because they have played no role or only a marginal role in
bringing them about.67
However, the government’s concern is quite different when the
dispute is resolved in significant part because of the intervention of a
government-sponsored ADR program. In these cases, the govern-
ment bears some responsibility for effecting the settlement, and it
also has legitimized the settlement to a large degree. Consequently,
government-mandated ADR efforts such as court-ordered mediation
                                                                                                                   
63. In Florida, for example, the court may order nonbinding arbitration. See FLA.
STAT. § 44.103 (1995). However, Florida courts have ordered arbitration only infrequently
in the more than eight years of the statutory authority. For example, from 1991 through
1995, fewer than 500 cases were arbitrated, while more than 300,000 matters were medi-
ated in county, family, and circuit court mediation programs. See Telephone Interview
with Sharon Press, Director, Fla. Disp. Resol. Ctr. (Jan. 28, 1997).
64. The court can also order arbitration, even though it, like mediation, is nonbinding.
65. This is not always so. Settlement agreements are contracts, and the judicial sys-
tem has long policed contracts using the yardstick of unconscionability. Unconscionability
is generally defined as an agreement that is unreasonably favorable to one of the parties.
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 327-29 (2d ed. 1991).
66. Again, this freedom to make bad deals is not absolute. Class action settlements
must ordinarily be approved by the court, as must settlements involving minors or anti-
trust claims by the government.
67. At a minimum, however, the legal system has provided default rules that will
govern resolution of the dispute if it is litigated. This creates a “shadow of the law” under
which the parties must bargain. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-70 (1979) (noting
that when reaching divorce settlements, disputants negotiate and settle cases with an eye
to the range of likely outcomes at trial if settlement is not achieved).
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must avoid not only the nonadjudicatory coercion of too much
evaluative mediating, but also the danger of state-sponsored extrac-
tion of unfair settlements by the party with more leverage, in part
due to the fastidiously facilitative efforts of the court-appointed me-
diator. Because the mediator is to some extent “forced” on the parties
by the court, the disputants will often have a tendency to believe
that whatever occurs under the auspices of the mediation is within
the range of outcomes that would result from litigation. If the media-
tor permits the parties to reach settlements that fall outside this
admittedly broad range of “adjudication default probabilities,” at
least one of the parties may pay a heavy price for the mediator’s as-
siduously facilitative approach.
In my view, the price is too high. The world is awash in unfair-
ness about which the legal system can do little or that legal inter-
vention will only make worse, often while incurring substantial addi-
tional costs. Nevertheless, when the legal system requires mediation
or other ADR, the courts have a duty to ensure that court-sponsored
ADR does not impose more unfairness than would exist in the ab-
sence of judicially imposed ADR. If the courts force parties to medi-
ate and force the mediator to blithely facilitate unfair case resolu-
tions, the system becomes an active wrongdoer. To minimize the
chance of these occurrences, court-ordered mediation must clearly
enable mediators to adopt styles that not only encourage resolution,
but also prevent unfairness. In addition, courts should take steps to
reduce the chances of unfair mediated outcomes by ensuring that the
mediators to whom cases are referred are not so inflexibly committed
to either pure facilitation or pure evaluation.
B.   Ignoring the Market—and Reality—at Peril
By now, my disagreement with Florida’s conventional wisdom
about acceptable mediation behavior is obvious. Florida law appears
to require that mediators be the legal equivalent of Woody Allen’s
“Zelig”68 or political consultant Dick Morris: an entity that sup-
presses its own opinions and merely reflects the opinions of others. If
Florida law accurately captures the preference of Florida citizens,
one would expect litigants opting for or ordered into mediation to
seek out purely facilitative mediators who refrain from any evalua-
tive feedback to the parties.
In practice, however, it appears that the most highly sought me-
diators are those who provide exactly this sort of evaluative feedback
to the parties and use some measure of evaluation as part of their fa-
cilitation of reasonable party dialogue leading to settlement. Each
                                                                                                                   
68. See ZELIG (United Artists 1985).
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day in the field, many mediators do engage in what might be termed
evaluative behavior,69 and evaluative-style mediators, particularly
former judges, appear strongly in demand as mediators.70 To an ex-
tent, then, the modern market for ADR exhibits a strong preference
for at least some of the evaluative tactics displayed by judges over
the years.
Defenders of the facilitative approach would undoubtedly be quick
to state that this activity, whatever its overall worth, is not true me-
diation.71 Although this criticism is perhaps theoretically true, it is so
in large part because the facilitation forces have defined mediation
somewhat tautologically as including only facilitation and no evalua-
tion. A mere drop of evaluation in their view converts mediation to
med-arb (mediation combined with arbitration) or some similar
mixed process. Rather than viewing the situation from the theoretical
perspective of ex ante definition, it might be more accurate to define
mediation ex post. If, in actual use of what is generally considered me-
diation, participants frequently prefer mediators who bring evaluative
techniques to the process, the legal system may be bucking reality to
insist that “real” mediation lacks any evaluative component.
Obviously, there is no objectively verifiable data from which one
can accurately gauge the proportion of evaluative and facilitative ac-
tivity currently occurring under the rubric of mediation. However,
the anecdotal evidence provided by participants in the system is
strongly suggestive. Mediators like Conference panelist Lawrence
Watson, Esq., and others appear to be in demand (at least for parties
with cases and resources large enough to afford the fees) not only for
their interpersonal facilitative skills, but also for their ability to
evaluate party positions and to encourage disputants to argue over
the range of the reasonable. These sorts of mediators, at least by
reputation, do not assiduously refrain from editorial comment, but
use it selectively and fairly.
Even advocates of the facilitative approach readily acknowledge
that it is not the exclusive approach to mediation as today practiced.
For example, Professor Robert A. Baruch Bush, who champions a
model of transformative and empowering mediation clearly within the
                                                                                                                   
69. See Alfini, supra note 4, at 66-72 (identifying the popular tactic of “trashing” that is
highly evaluative, another “bashing” tactic that strongly incorporates evaluation, and the third
identified tactic of “hashing” that most closely resembles the facilitative model of mediation).
70. See John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform One
Another?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 844-53 (1997); see also Margaret A. Jacobs, Renting
Justice: Retired Judges Seize Rising Role in Settling Disputes in California, WALL ST. J.,
July 26, 1996, at A1.
71. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 929 (comments of Professor Lela
Love) (“It would be a different case if the parties chose the mediator for her evaluation
abilities and specifically requested the mediator’s evaluation. In that situation, the proc-
ess is ‘mixed’—not pure mediation . . . .”).
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facilitative school, also identifies several other mediation styles that
are substantially or primarily evaluative: “settlors,” “fixers” or prob-
lem-solvers, “protectors,” and “reconcilors.”72 Although one can quib-
ble about whether all of these approaches are really mediation, it may
be more productive to accept all as legitimate forms of mediation that
vary in appropriateness according to the context of the particular case.
Although pure facilitators can make rhetorical claims that states
such as Florida have embraced facilitative mediation and no other by
force of statute and rule, this again seems overly formal and conclu-
sory. Mediation in Florida and elsewhere should not be frozen in a
“facilitation only” model simply by historical accident, i.e., because
the facilitative model was uppermost in the minds of the profession
when it adopted mediation as its major component of court-
sponsored ADR. With an additional decade of experience, we can see
that the disputing public appears to affirmatively desire some
evaluative components in mediation. Rather than fight the market
with an excessively formal commitment to the facilitative model, the
legal profession and the judiciary should regulate mediator behavior
with flexibility and restraint.
If this anecdotal evidence is correct, the market comprised of dis-
putants is sending a powerful message in favor of hybrid mediation
that permits some use of evaluative technique. Normally, American
governments require a compelling reason for interfering in or re-
versing market decisions. Particularly in today’s political climate,
government intervention of this type must ordinarily be justified by
a compelling case of market failure (e.g., badly distributed invest-
ment in education or national defense or discriminatory employment
practices) or destructive choices by market participants (e.g., smok-
ing). On this broad premise, both liberals and conservatives agree,
even if they often divide in their assessment of specific situations.
Courts, like any other arm of government, should operate under the
same general standard. Consequently, if it appears that disputants
do not want a purely nonevaluative mediator, there is no reason for
the State of Florida to require that disputants have this type of me-
diator when the state orders them to mediate. In this sense, current
Florida mediation law appears to ignore the actual market for dis-
pute resolution services.
C.   Distributional Concerns and the False Dichotomy
Related to the problem of differential resources is the obvious fact
that both adjudication and settlement normally result in a transfer
of wealth. Usually, both trial and settlement require at least one
                                                                                                                   
72. Bush, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 17-18; see also BUSH & FOLGER, supra
note 7, at 11-12.
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disputant to give up something to another disputant. Although crea-
tive mediation or negotiation can result in “win-win” outcomes of
disputes, even these outcomes usually require one party to give up
something in return for something surrendered by the opponent.
When the system works well, litigation, ADR, and private settlement
outcomes should largely result in at least corrective justice and per-
haps even wealth creation. Adjudication is unlikely to result in dis-
tributive justice because courts exist primarily to enforce existing le-
gal rights, most of which are based on the status quo rather than any
entitlement to distributive just deserts.73
Thus, properly performed adjudication gives the parties what
they would or should have had in the absence of the dispute. What-
ever inequalities preceded the litigation remain after the litigation—
but the litigation, at least usually, does not enhance inequality.
However, favorable settlements extracted by parties with superior
leverage may accentuate distributional inequity. Such settlements
reached through court-ordered mediation that would otherwise have
proceeded through adjudication arguably result in a government-
sponsored program (mediation) that operates in some cases to en-
hance inequitable distribution of wealth rather than to maintain the
existing assignment of wealth in society. Put another way, court-
ordered mediation that allows one party to reach advantageous set-
tlements it could otherwise not obtain serves to put the state in the
position of enhancing distributional inequities rather than holding
them steady or reducing them, the latter being the normally ac-
cepted roles of the modern industrialized nation-state.
Thus, current mediation orthodoxy lionizing the facilitative style
and criticizing even minor mediator evaluation appears to ignore
other aspects of reality as well. The cold, hard reality is that some
disputants are better situated to extract favorable settlements from
their opponents. Ironically, this probably occurs most often in the
sorts of “smaller” cases more likely to be ordered into mediation. In
larger cases, the parties are more likely to have equal financial
strength and legal sophistication. Even when one or more of the par-
ties lacks requisite sophistication, the sheer magnitude or impor-
tance of the dispute usually ensures that lawyers will be involved in
the matter, thus tending to level the playing field of legal sophistica-
tion.74
                                                                                                                   
73. There are exceptions, of course, in any modern welfare state. Medicare, Medicaid,
Social Security, public education, and the income tax can all be viewed as attempts at dis-
tributive justice, and to the extent that these programs create concrete legal rights, courts
enforcing these rights can be seen as effecting distributive as well as corrective justice.
74. See McEwen, supra note 17, at 1322-23, 1346-48, 1358-62 (suggesting that lawyer
involvement makes mediation outcomes fairer, more rational, and more in general con-
formity with prevailing law and policy).
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There is a glitch in this reasoning, of course: not all lawyers are
equally effective, and richer, more sophisticated disputants generally
retain more effective lawyers. However, despite the reality of differ-
ing legal talent, time, and logistical support, the presence of counsel
normally has a leavening effect. The disparity, for example, between
the average matrimonial lawyer and the best of the bar is probably
not as great as the disparity between the most sophisticated spouse
and the least sophisticated spouse. At least all the lawyers have
been to law school. Nonetheless, lawyers are at best only partial lev-
elers, and many of the disputants are mismatched.
When mismatched parties, whether represented or pro se, are
thrown together, any resulting settlement is more likely to favor the
party with superior resources. Court-ordered mediation should oper-
ate to minimize this tendency, not enshrine it. In the absence of
court-ordered mediation, of course, mismatched parties will probably
continue to arrive at unbalanced settlements as long as the rivers
flow. By definition, however, the disputants subject to possible court-
ordered mediation have commenced litigation and, if not ordered to
mediate, would have the claim presented to a neutral government of-
ficial and perhaps a jury of citizens as well. Although these dispu-
tants, like most litigants, will probably settle rather than litigate to
final judgment, they bargain in the shadow of the substantive law as
regulated by the procedural rules of the jurisdictions.75 When these
same disputants are channeled into mediation, the objective of the
court’s enterprise is to obtain a brokered settlement. When govern-
ment assumes an activist role encouraging settlement, it has a cor-
responding obligation to ensure that mediated resolutions are at
least no worse than nonmediated settlements or litigation outcomes.
My discussion, of course, proceeds with a tacit suggestion that in
court-ordered mediation, the “haves” tend to do better than the
“have-nots,” but the conventional wisdom is that this occurs in litiga-
tion as well.76 Whether that aspect of litigation should be changed
and how to change it lie well beyond the scope of this Article. My
point is simply that state-sponsored ADR should not operate to en-
hance inequality and that this prospect is a genuine concern when
mediator-brokered settlements contain no evaluative component.
The distributional impact can also run in the other direction. A me-
diated settlement may result in case resolution that would otherwise
not have occurred and may result in the richer party making to the
poorer party a wealth transfer that the latter does not “deserve” ac-
                                                                                                                   
75. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 67, at 968.
76. See Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 103-04 (1974) (suggesting that experienced liti-
gants as well as those with greater resources will generally have advantage over episodic
or poorer opponents).
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cording to the applicable law.77 This is the sort of “legal blackmail”
about which businesses complain, particularly in the context of al-
leged “strike” suits over securities violations. It can be a serious
problem, of course, but in the context of court-ordered mediation, it
concerns me less. The wealthier party probably has only a slight ad-
ditional incentive to “buy off” the poorer disputant in court-ordered
mediation than has been provided by the pending lawsuit. To some
degree, it is also true that the poorer party has only marginally more
pressure to settle due to mediation than exists anytime one is em-
broiled in litigation.
D.   Additional Factors Favoring a Place for Flexible and Evaluative
Approaches
1.   Game Theory and the Effective Mediator
Litigation and settlement can be profitably analyzed from the
perspective of game theory. Game theory involves analysis of behav-
ior based on the assumption that persons and entities will act stra-
tegically, seeking to “maximize their wealth given what they expect
the other party to do.”78
                                                                                                                   
77. For example, under current rules requiring securities fraud to be pleaded with
heightened particularity, a disgruntled investor’s claim may not be sufficiently detailed to
survive a motion to dismiss in litigation, but New York Stock Exchange arbitrators may
hear the matter and award damages, something that quite likely would not have occurred
had strict legal formality been observed. See Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Arbitration: Bet-
ter for Investors than the Courts?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997) (noting many se-
curities plaintiffs will do better in arbitration than in litigation).
78. MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 85
(1996). Although considered a branch of microeconomics, game theory involves a signifi-
cant analytic wrinkle:
Traditionally, price theory posits rational economic actors who pursue the
maximization of wealth straightforwardly in situations for which the opportu-
nities available to one individual are considered independent of the choices of
other individuals. In reality, however, the economic opportunities available to
one actor may depend directly on the choices made by another.
Id. at 85. For further discussion of game theory, see id. at 85-89. See also DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND
INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (1989) (game theory suggests that par-
ties will seize opportunities for strategic behavior, at least when the “game” is not a coop-
erative one, but they can be at least partially restrained by enforcement of particular
rules or exposure of strategies); DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 130 (1994)
(noting literature that observed a game player to have “obtained a disproportionately
large payoff by misrepresenting her utility function in order to upset consensus on a fair
outcome”); id. at 142-44 (noting that current political science scholarship sees most games
as noncooperative rather than cooperative); Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42
STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1295-96 (1990) (noting that even with well-defined “rules” of the
“game,” such as litigation or settlement, parties will try to take advantage of one another).
The classic illustration of game theory is the “prisoner’s dilemma” hypothetical, which
posits that two suspects have been separated by the police and offered incentives to turn
against one another and provide incriminating testimony. The first suspect to agree to co-
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A full discussion of game theory is obviously impossible in this
limited Article. However, applied to civil disputes, game theory sug-
gests that disputants will behave strategically and seek to obtain an
advantage in the settlement or adjudication of a case based on the
opponent’s expected conduct. When operating in this strategic fash-
ion, a game participant will attempt to achieve the best result avail-
able. Thus, to return to the hypothetical divorce between the invest-
ment banker and the homemaker, the husband who knows or sus-
pects that the wife is desperate to end the tension of the failed mar-
riage will use this to his advantage by proffering the low-ball settle-
ment discussed in the hypothetical.
One might even put a variant of the prisoner’s dilemma into this
scene.79 Assume the husband has moved out and has been retaining
his paycheck, creating a cashflow problem for the wife, who must
continue to raise two children and manage a house. The husband’s
offer, an immediate cash settlement, provides perhaps an irresistible
carrot to the wife, who must otherwise wait for a substantial amount
of time in the hope of obtaining more money. If the marginal value of
a dollar is high, the wife may not be able to resist settling cheaply
but quickly, even if she knows the settlement is cheap. If the wife is
less sophisticated and does not realize the offer is low, her incentives
to cash out quickly but unwisely are heightened. In addition, the
strategically behaving husband (or his lawyer) will be likely to paint
the most excessively grim picture possible of the wife’s ultimate
chances for success should the matter be fully litigated. If both par-
ties are without lawyers or the wife lacks a lawyer (or has a less-
qualified lawyer), she is unlikely to realize that the husband has
misled her regarding likely judicial outcomes. Consequently, when
the husband and wife talk settlement, a purely nonevaluative type of
mediator facilitation is likely to result in a technically “voluntary”
settlement in which the wife and children receive an inadequate
award.
Although this may be the outcome in the absence of court-ordered
mediation, I find it more than a little troubling that mandatory me-
diation, even if nonbinding, holds the potential to contribute to such
                                                                                                                   
operate is offered a plea bargain that involves no incarceration, while the government will
seek the maximum ten-year sentence against the noncooperating defendant. If both re-
main silent, the expected chance of conviction is only 10%, making the “estimated” sen-
tence for each one year in jail if they remain firm in their noncooperation. If both cooper-
ate, they will be convicted and the prosecutor will seek seven-year sentences. Under these
circumstances, each defendant has a powerful incentive to race to cooperate to save him-
self at the expense of the co-defendant. In reality, of course, the probabilities and penalties
are seldom so clear cut, but the theory works in practice (i.e., despite the adage about
honor among thieves, many criminals turn state’s evidence to obtain a lighter sentence)
and has substantial value in explaining strategic behavior.
79. For a description of the prisoner’s dilemma, see supra note 78.
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outcomes by forcing the parties to work toward a resolution that is
presided over by a mediator operating under the broad auspices of
the judicial system. In addition, such a result becomes doubly tragic
because effective mediation that makes judicious use of evaluative
techniques has great potential to avoid the unfairness. For example,
the mediator could advise the wife of the mediator’s understanding
of the general parameters of applicable law and the range of likely
outcomes should the case be adjudicated, as well as the approxi-
mate time required for full litigation of the matter. In addition, and
more evaluatively, the mediator could state that the husband’s ini-
tial offer is markedly below the generally held range of permissible
settlements for cases of this type. Either of these mediator actions
would go a long way toward avoiding the unfairness that will likely
result if the mediator merely “facilitates” the husband and wife in
the direction of settlement. Unfortunately, either one of these rea-
sonable mediator reactions appears to be forbidden by current Flor-
ida law.80
Further, game theory suggests that a party’s strategic response
will vary significantly according to intervening moves by the other
party. The dispute game is generally a dynamic one in which the
parties’ attitudes, positions, and overtures will change over time or
in response to the other party’s conduct or intervening events (for
example, the investment banker husband may be suddenly
downsized, either spouse may find another romantic and economi-
cally secure interest, one spouse may discover another’s infidelity or
child abuse). These developments may either accelerate or inhibit
party motivation to settle. They may also affect each side’s professed
terms of the settlement (an obvious example is the child abuse de-
velopment, which obviously affects the child custody and visitation
issues). A mediator providing evaluative feedback to the parties in
light of the changed circumstances may be able to prevent unfair set-
tlements in light of the changed scenario. Facilitation alone may
provide the requisite flexibility, but if it does not, the mediator
should be permitted to perform some evaluative activity.
2.   Chaos Theory and the Effective Mediator
Related to the issue of dynamic game theory is the general law of
inevitable change. Things seldom stay static, and the direction and
magnitude of change is often annoyingly difficult to predict. An
emerging branch of study, generally labeled chaos theory or complex-
ity theory, posits that unpredictably is essentially inherent because of
                                                                                                                   
80. See discussion supra Part III (describing Florida law, as interpreted by Florida
Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, as precluding any hint of mediator evaluation).
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changes not resulting in chain-like ripple effects and manifestation.81
The weather in Nebraska will not invariably move unchanged into
Iowa. As one commentator put it, the flapping of a butterfly’s wings
may serve to prompt changes in air currents that ultimately result
in a completely unanticipated subsequent weather outcome.82 Law,
like any other system, is nonlinear and moves in unpredictable ways
at times.83
In litigation and ADR, chaos theory is almost a given. The shape
of the dispute, the likely default outcome, and the attitudes of the
parties will surely change throughout the course of the matter. Ap-
propriately responding to these changes requires mediator flexibil-
ity, which of course will often take the form of generally facilitative
techniques. Nevertheless, the mediator’s arsenal of appropriate
flexible responses should also contain an array of primarily evalua-
tive techniques.
To illustrate: assume a changed version of the husband-wife hy-
pothetical. Initially, the husband is not inclined to make a low-ball
settlement offer. Rather, racked by guilt and being a basically honest
person, he affirmatively wants to give his estranged wife and chil-
dren more than their legal entitlement without the delay and ex-
pense of litigation. The initial mediation session appears to be mov-
ing in the direction of a voluntary settlement within the range of
outcomes generally regarded as acceptable by the legal system.
Then, the husband acquires a new love interest, a widow with three
children (and a dead husband who had no life insurance). Rather
suddenly, the husband’s interest in a generous divorce settlement
plummets. At the next mediation session, the husband has back-
tracked and now makes a low-ball offer. Still later in the process, he
is visited by his mother, who inflicts significant guilt on him for his
willingness to shortchange her grandchildren in favor of his prospec-
tive new family. Under these circumstances, the mediator obviously
should not use the same techniques that would have been in order
had the attitude of the husband not changed. Some different tactic
will be necessary. Perhaps the case is no longer apt for mediation
and should be referred back to court. Although essentially facilita-
tive techniques may move the parties toward the acceptable range of
resolutions, the mediator may need to perform the sort of evaluative
appraisal that is appropriate had the husband begun with an adver-
sarial, advantage-taking, low-ball initial stance.
                                                                                                                   
81. See BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISDICTIONAL PRIMER 44-45 (1994).
82. See id. at 45.
83. See J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evo-
lution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV.
1407, 1409-10 (1996).
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Florida mediation law should not unduly tie the mediator to the
purely facilitative mast. Just as important, the effective mediator
should not tie him or herself to either a predominantly facilitative or
a predominantly evaluative methodology that may become clearly
inappropriate in light of changed circumstances. The point is per-
haps even more effectively illustrated by imagining that the divorce
hypothetical moves in a different direction. Assume the initially ad-
versarial husband comes to realize that stealing a financial march on
his wife is not only unfair to her, but also only serves to hurt his
children. When a disputant has moved to a more cooperative stance
(with or without a guilt trip from grandma), it would make little
sense for the mediator to engage in heavy-handed evaluation (e.g.,
“Your offer is still five percent below the average for people in your
income bracket, Mr. Husband, when are you going to quit nickel-
and-diming your family?”) when a more facilitative approach seems
well-suited to the task (e.g., “Have both of you thought about the
possibility of inflation and likely increases in college tuition? What
about the chance that one of the children will want to attend gradu-
ate school?”). Because disputes are dynamic, and adjudication only
partially predictable with effects and outcomes even chaotic, media-
tors must be able to shift between varying hybrids of the evaluative
and facilitative modes to maximize effectiveness in spurring case
resolution without sacrificing fairness.
3.   Value-Added Mediation
Recent scholarship has suggested that mediation adds value to
the disputing transaction by providing the parties with information
and structured evaluation that they cannot themselves provide.84
This view, although more self-consciously based on economic analy-
sis, fits comfortably with the sociological and psychological scholar-
ship that suggests parties benefit significantly from being accorded a
relatively timely, reasonably formal opportunity to present their case
to a neutral third party and to receive a fair and reflective hearing of
the matter.85 Depending upon the orientation of the parties, the case
might ultimately be better resolved by varying degrees of neutral fa-
cilitation or neutral evaluation. However, both economic and socio-
logical analysis tends to suggest that more value is added to the pro-
                                                                                                                   
84. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Economic Rationales for Media-
tion, 80 VA. L. REV. 323, 324-31 (1994).
85. See E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 101-06 (1988); see also McEwen, supra note 17, at 1378-84; E. Allan Lind et al., In
the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Jus-
tice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953, 980-83 (1990) (noting that disputants have more
satisfaction with the process when they can participate and be heard before a neutral
third party).
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cess when the mediator not only gives the parties a forum and as-
sists them in new ways of assessing the dispute, but also provides
some yardstick for assessing the options and some information about
the range of default options if the matter is adjudicated rather than
settled.86
V.   THE LIMITS OF EVALUATION: MEDIATION MUST BE MEDIATION—
MAYBE
Even my support of hybrid or evaluative mediation has limits.
Mediation differs from arbitration or early neutral evaluation in sig-
nificant part because of the procedural and substantive expectations
of the parties. For example, in approaching mediation, the parties
may present information differently, may argue for resolution not
supported under current law, or may engage in other disputing be-
havior that differs rather substantially from the disputant’s posture
when he or she knows the case will be evaluated and even adjudi-
cated by arbitrator. In these latter situations, the disputants are
more likely to present information as advocacy and less as back-
ground for negotiation or problem-solving. When properly employed
and faithfully participated in by parties genuinely desirous of ex-
ploring mediated resolution rather than adjudication, mediation of-
fers substantial creative and transformative potential. Meditation
can then accomplish things foreclosed in litigation without dimin-
ishing fairness.
To the extent mediation veers too far from the voluntary, coopera-
tive, facilitative assumptions that spurred its growth, it loses some of
this creative and transformative potential. Some of this is inevitable,
however, when the mediation is court-ordered or when one or more
of the parties is not approaching mediation in the cooperative spirit.
Not every dispute will be amenable to facilitative mediation, and ef-
fective mediators must respond accordingly. Sometimes (perhaps oft-
times), however, the apt response will be to cease mediation and
route the dispute toward a more adjudicatory alternative. Some dis-
putes are simply not apt for mediation unless the mediator becomes
so evaluative or coercive as to have ceased being a mediator and be-
come an arbitrator or the equivalent.
Although keeping mediation as mediation has strong appeal, in
seeking to implement effective ADR mechanisms, courts should give
more serious consideration to granting omnibus discretion to ADR
                                                                                                                   
86. See McEwen, supra note 17, at 1378-84 (realizing that a lawyer’s contributions of
legal rules and options not only protect parties, but also add information that may in-
crease settlement options); see also Ayres & Brown, supra note 84, at 373-85, 395 (sug-
gesting that information imparted by the parties to the mediator, drawn from the parties
by the mediator, or contributed by the mediator may increase opportunities for an infor-
mal resolution of the conflict).
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officers. It is not at all clear that the best means of spurring dispute
resolution might not be to initially assign all such claims to a judicial
adjunct (either a corps of government employees or a panel of attor-
neys willing to fulfill the role) who can mediate, evaluate, arbitrate,
presumptively find fact or law, or recommend in order to seek resolu-
tion.87
As long as the parties have the option of further review by the
court that is not unduly deferential to the ADR official’s determina-
tion, this style of approach would not appear to be an impediment to
the right to a jury trial.88 Merging ADR efforts and permitting facili-
tation or evaluation to proceed on a case-specific basis rather than a
categorical basis may provide a more efficient means of serving both
efficiency and fairness. At a minimum, such a merged approach
would at least drive a stake (although probably not the final stake)
through the heart of the false dichotomy of facilitation versus
evaluation.
VI.   CONCLUSION
The magnitude of the ADR revolution during the past decade,
particularly in Florida, has been vast indeed. But the developing
ADR infrastructure should reject, once and for all, attempts to seg-
regate and pidgeonhole ADR devices according to particular models
of theoretical purity. Ultimately, the best guarantee of effective ADR
is the same as the best guarantee of effective adjudication: the com-
mon-law case-by-case determination of disputes through means apt
for the instant case. False dichotomies only impede this goal.
                                                                                                                   
87. See Stempel, supra note 7, at 361-89 (proposing greater government operation of
ADR premised on flexible intake and initial assignment of cases according to specific
characteristics).
88. See Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 568 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding
that compulsory court-annexed arbitration did not violate the Seventh Amendment as
long as the dissatisfied party may demand a trial de novo with jury).
